





































































UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
 




T-MOBILE US, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
 
Case No.  17-cv-07232-BLF    
 
 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOURTH AMENDED CLASS 
AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
COMPLAINT 
[Re:  ECF 143, 165] 
 
This is a case about employment discrimination in “the Cyber Age,” S. Dakota v. Wayfair, 
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018).  It has often been said that the Internet has wrought “far-
reaching systemic and structural changes in the economy.”  Id.  One of these changes is the ability 
for companies like Facebook to collect enormous amounts of data about people through their 
social media activity and online behavior more generally.  These companies have harnessed that 
information in many ways, including crafting so-called “targeted ads.”  Targeted ads are 
personalized to the user, featuring the products, services, and opportunities of greatest interest to 
that user.  In theory, both advertisers and users benefit: Advertisers can spend their marketing 
dollars more efficiently, and users see more interesting content.  In Plaintiffs’ view, however, this 
kind of targeting can also be used in insidious ways—namely, to deny access to information to 
certain groups of people and thereby advance discriminatory aims.  Specifically, the plaintiffs in 
this case believe that Defendants T-Mobile US, Inc. (“T-Mobile”) and Amazon.com, Inc. 
(“Amazon”) routinely exclude older individuals from viewing the employment ads they post on 
Facebook.  In an effort to stop that practice, Plaintiffs have brought this putative class action 
alleging violations of various federal and state laws.   
Defendants move to dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint (“4AC”) on multiple grounds, 





































































including lack of Article III standing, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted.  As set forth below, the Court holds that the 4AC does not 
currently contain the allegations necessary to establish standing or personal jurisdiction, but that 
Plaintiffs have adequately justified their narrow request for jurisdictional discovery.  Accordingly, 
the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss with LEAVE TO AMEND and GRANTS the request 
for jurisdictional discovery.   
I. BACKGROUND 
The following facts are drawn from the 4AC, which the Court must treat as true at the 
pleading stage, Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011).   
A. Defendants’ Alleged Conduct 
The defendants in this case are T-Mobile US, Inc. (“T-Mobile”) and Amazon.com, Inc. 
(“Amazon”).  These two major U.S. companies need little introduction.  T-Mobile is one of the 
largest wireless companies in the United States”; it provides “wireless communications services 
including voice, messaging and data, to more than 71 million customers” and, as of December 
2016, employs “approximately 50,000 full-time and part-time employees.”  4AC ¶ 39.  Amazon is 
“one of the largest online retailers in the world.”  Id. ¶ 40.  Headquartered in Seattle, Washington, 
it “employed 341,400 full-time and part-time employees as of December 31, 2016.”  Id.   
This suit concerns Defendants’ methods of recruiting prospective employees, which 
Plaintiffs believe discriminate against older workers.  In particular, both Defendants allegedly use 
Facebook’s ad platform to advertise employment opportunities at their various stores and 
operations.  4AC ¶¶ 39-40.  According to Plaintiffs, “Facebook has emerged as one of the largest 
venues for employers to seek applicants for employment and for workers to find job 
opportunities.”  Id. ¶ 46.  As “the most popular social media platform in the world,” id. ¶ 41, 
Facebook collects a vast amount of information about its users, id. ¶ 44.  Facebook then gives its 
advertisers “the power to use that information to determine which Facebook users will be included 
or excluded in the population that will receive their ads.”  Id.  Facebook promotes such targeted 
advertising to employers as helping them to “minimize the cost of reaching people who are 
interested in news jobs and maximize the number of people who respond to employment ads.”  Id. 





































































¶ 45.  Factors that advertisers can use to target ads include “age, gender, location, interests, and 
behaviours.”  Id.   
Defendants are alleged to have used Facebook’s ad targeting functionality to recruit 
younger workers and not older workers.  They did this by imposing a “ceiling on the age of people 
who will receive their job advertisements.”  4AC ¶ 82.  Plaintiffs summarize the basic practice at 
issue as follows: 
When an employer or an employment agency creates, purchases, and 
sends a Facebook ad to make workers aware of job opportunities and 
encourage them to apply for various jobs, Facebook requires the 
employers or employment agencies to select the population of 
Facebook users who will be eligible to receive the ad, including the 
age range of the users who will receive the ad.  Following Facebook’s 
encouragement to narrowly focus ad campaigns on the “right people,” 
including by targeting younger people, upon information and belief, 
Defendants have routinely focused their Facebook employment ads 
on users who are under 40-years-old (and sometimes on users who 
are under higher age thresholds).  This prevents workers who are 
above the selected age threshold from receiving employment ads and 
pursuing relevant job opportunities. 
Id. ¶ 17.  Plaintiffs further allege that “[t]he default age setting for ads is 18 to 65+, which means 
that anyone who is 18-years-old or older would receive the ad.”  Id. ¶ 63.  As a result, Plaintiffs 
say, “any employer or employment agency that selects a narrower and younger age range (such as 
ages 18 to 40) is consciously and purposefully choosing to target younger prospective applicants 
and thereby excluding older applicants who will not receive the ad.”  Id.   
Defendants’ employment ads—and Facebook employment ads in general—are not 
typically for individual job opportunities; rather, they “direct the Facebook user to [the 
advertiser’s] ‘Careers’ or company Facebook pages, in addition to a page on the company’s 
website page that has information about a range of job opportunities throughout the company.”  
4AC ¶ 49.  Thus, the prospective applicant can view “all available positions for which she or he 
could apply and encourages prospective employees to apply for such positions.”  Id.   
Also relevant to this case is a function called “Why am I seeing this.”  When a Facebook 
user sees an ad, he or she can click on the “Why am I seeing this” function to view why he or she 
has been selected to see that particular ad.  4AC ¶¶ 84-85.  For instance, a user might see that “T-
Mobile wants to reach people ages 18 to 38 who live or were recently in the United States.”  Id. ¶ 





































































85.  Thus, the user can view the age range that the advertiser selected. 
The 4AC included the below exemplars of two age-restricted ads and the associated “Why 
am I seeing this” pages:  
4AC ¶¶ 2, 92.  Other exemplars are attached the 4AC as Exhibit A.  ECF 140-1.   
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have employed age-restricted ads on Facebook to 
advertise “jobs that were located throughout the states where these employers employ workers, 
including jobs in this District and elsewhere in California, the District of Columbia, and Ohio.”  
4AC ¶ 97.  Specifically, as to T-Mobile, the 4AC alleges that “T-Mobile advertised jobs in 42 
states and the District of Columbia,” id. ¶ 39; as to Amazon, the 4AC alleges that Amazon 





































































advertised “for a range of positions . . . throughout the United States,” id. ¶ 40.   
B. The Instant Suit 
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ use of age-restricted employment ads is part of a 
“pattern or practice of age discrimination in employment advertising, recruitment, and hiring.”  
4AC ¶¶ 89, 150.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs filed this putative class action, alleging two basic legal 
theories.  First, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) makes it unlawful for an 
employer “to print or public, or cause to be printed or published, any notice or advertisement 
relating to employment by such employer . . . indicating any preference, limitation, specification, 
or discrimination, based on age.”  29 U.S.C. § 623(e).  Plaintiffs believe that Defendants’ 
advertisements “indicate a preference” for younger workers and against older workers by (1) being 
targeted to younger workers and excluded from older workers, and (2) informing users of the 
targeting through the “Why am I seeing this” function.  4AC ¶¶ 12, 151; see Opp. at 18-19, 22. 
Second, the ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or . . . 
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).  Plaintiffs 
contend that Defendants’ age-restricted advertising constitutes disparate treatment in hiring 
because it is disparate treatment in recruiting.  See Opp. at 23.  That is, employers only hire the 
people who apply, who are the people they recruit; by favoring younger workers in recruitment, 
Defendants necessarily favor them in hiring.  Id.; see 4AC ¶¶ 166, 168.   
Plaintiffs allege these theories under the ADEA and similar state laws.  The operative 4AC 
contains eleven counts: (1) discriminatory publication or advertising by an employer, in violation 
of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(e); (2) disparate treatment in recruiting and hiring, in violation of 
the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); (3) discriminatory publication or advertising by an employer, in 
violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“California FEHA”), Cal. Gov. 
Code § 12940(d); (4) discriminatory publication or advertising, in violation of the District of 
Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a); (5) discriminatory 
publication or advertising, in violation of the Ohio Fair Employment Practices Law (“OFEPL”), 
Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(E)(4); (6) intentional discrimination in recruiting and hiring, in 





































































violation of the California FEHA, Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a); (7) intentional discrimination in 
recruiting and hiring, in violation of the DCHRA, D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a)(1); (8) intentional 
discrimination in recruiting and hiring, in violation of the OFEPL, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.02(A), 
4112.14(A); (9) violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51; (10) 
violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 51.5; (11) 
violation of the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et 
seq.  Plaintiffs seek an injunction permanently enjoining Defendants from using age-restricted 
employment ads, as well as the other forms of relief available under the above-listed statutes.  See 
4AC ¶ 3, p. 68.    
The Plaintiffs in this case consist of the Communications Workers of America (“CWA”), 
four individual Named Plaintiffs, a “Plaintiff Class,” and a “Plaintiff Collective.”  The CWA is 
“an international labor union representing over 700,000 workers in a broad range of industries, 
including telecommunications, cable, information technology, airline, manufacturing, print and 
broadcast news media, education, public service, and healthcare.”  4AC ¶ 30.  The four individual 
Named Plaintiffs are: Linda Bradley, a 45-year-old woman living in Franklin County, Ohio, 4AC 
¶ 31; Maurice Anscombe, a 57-year-old man living in Baltimore County, Maryland, id. ¶ 33; Lura 
Callahan, a 67-year-old woman living in Franklin County, Ohio, id. ¶ 35; and Richard Hayne, a 
61-year-old man living in Oakland, California, id. ¶ 37.  All four Named Plaintiffs are proposed 
representatives of a nationwide “Plaintiff Collective” of 
All persons in the United States who from the earliest date actionable 
under the limitations applicable to the given claim until the date of 
judgment in this action (1) were 40 years old or older (2) used 
Facebook during a time in which they were searching for 
employment, and (3) were excluded from being eligible to receive an 
employment-related advertisement or notice because one or more of 
the Defendants placed an upper age limit on the population of 
Facebook users that was eligible to receive an advertisement or 
notice. 
Id. ¶ 140.1  In addition, Haynie is the proposed representative of a smaller “Plaintiff Class” of  
All persons who from the earliest date actionable under the limitations 
                                                 
1 The ADEA incorporates enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, including the 
collective action provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  See 29 U.S.C. § 621.   





































































applicable to the given claim until the date of judgment in this action 
(1) were 40 years old or older (2) used Facebook during a time in 
which they were searching for employment and resided in California, 
and (3) were excluded from being eligible to receive an employment-
related advertisement or notice because one or more Defendants 
placed an upper age limit on the population of Facebook users that 
was eligible to receive an advertisement or notice. 
Id. ¶ 121.   
The counts in the 4AC are brought by various combinations of these Plaintiffs.  
Specifically, the ADEA claims (Counts 1 and 2) are brought by the Named Plaintiffs and the 
Plaintiff Collective; the California FEHA claims (Counts 3 and 6) are brought by Haynie and the 
Plaintiff Class; the UCL and Unruh Act claims (Counts 10 and 11) are brought by Haynie, the 
CWA, and the Plaintiff Class; and the remaining claims under D.C. and Ohio state law (Counts 4, 
5, 7, 8, and 9) are brought by certain Named Plaintiffs in their individual capacities.   
Defendants now move to dismiss the 4AC on various grounds.  ECF 143 (“Mot.”).  This is 
Defendants’ third motion to dismiss the operative complaint, but the first that has come before the 
Court for a ruling.  See ECF 73 (Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”)), ECF 
63 (Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)).  The motion has been fully 
briefed, ECF 147 (“Opp.”), ECF 155 (“Reply”), and the Court conducted a hearing on January 30, 
2020, ECF 164.    
II. LEGAL STANDARDS 
In the instant motion, Defendants raise three grounds for dismissing the various claims in 
the 4AC: lack of subject matter jurisdiction, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1); lack 
of personal jurisdiction, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2); and failure to state a 
claim, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Mot. at 4, 9, 15.  Below, the Court reviews 
the relevant legal standards for each type of motion.   
C. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction  
A motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests whether the court has 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims alleged in the complaint.  A Rule 12(b)(1) motion 
may be either facial, where the inquiry is limited to the allegations in the complaint, or factual, 
where the court may look beyond the complaint to consider extrinsic evidence.  Wolfe v. 





































































Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004).  Here, Defendants lodge a facial attack on the 
sufficiency of the allegations in the 4AC.  See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 
1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (in a facial attack under Rule 12(b)(1), “the challenger asserts that the 
allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.”).  
A district court “resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): 
Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's 
favor, the court determines whether the allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the 
court’s jurisdiction.”  Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014).  As with a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, however, a court is not required “to accept as true allegations that are merely 
conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”  In re Gilead Scis. Sec. 
Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008); see Thomas v. Mundell, 572 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 
2009) (finding allegations “too vague” to support standing).   
In the instant motion, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, which “is 
a necessary component of subject matter jurisdiction.”  In re Palmdale Hills Prop., LLC, 654 F.3d 
868, 873 (9th Cir. 2011).  The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the “irreducible 
constitutional minimum of standing” consists of three elements.  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  “The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly 
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a 
favorable judicial decision.”  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).  These 
elements are often referred to as injury in fact, causation, and redressability.  See, e.g., Planned 
Parenthood of Greater Washington & N. Idaho v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 946 F.3d 
1100, 1108 (9th Cir. 2020).  Plaintiffs, as the parties invoking federal jurisdiction, bear the burden 
of establishing the existence of Article III standing and, at the pleading stage, “must clearly allege 
facts demonstrating each element.”  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted); see also Baker v. United States, 722 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The facts to 
show standing must be clearly apparent on the face of the complaint.”).   
“In a class action, this standing inquiry focuses on the class representatives.”  NEI 
Contracting & Eng’g, Inc. v. Hanson Aggregates Pac. Sw., Inc., 926 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 





































































2019).  Standing for the putative class “is satisfied if at least one named plaintiff meets the 
requirements.”  Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007).  But if none 
of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class can establish standing to sue, the class 
action cannot proceed.  See NEI Contracting, 926 F.3d at 532 (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 
488, 494 (1974)).   
Finally, the Court notes that standing, as a limit upon the power of a federal court, must be 
established before the Court may proceed to the merits.  Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-
Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1950 (2019).   
D. Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) authorizes a defendant to seek dismissal of an 
action for lack of personal jurisdiction.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).  “In opposing a defendant's 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 
that jurisdiction is proper.”  CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th 
Cir. 2011).  Courts may consider evidence presented in affidavits and declarations in determining 
personal jurisdiction.  Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001).  “Where, as here, 
the defendant’s motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the 
plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to 
dismiss.”  Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  “Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and factual 
disputes are construed in the plaintiff’s favor,” Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Aero Law 
Grp., 905 F.3d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 2018), but a court is not “required to accept as true allegations 
that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences,” In re 
Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d at 1055. 
In general, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction “if a rule or statute authorizes it to do 
so and the exercise of such jurisdiction comports with the constitutional requirement of due 
process.”  Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2001).  “When no federal 
statute governs personal jurisdiction, the district court applies the law of the forum state.”  Id.; see 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).  “California’s long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal 





































































jurisdiction to the full extent permissible under the U.S. Constitution.”  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 
571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 410.10).  Constitutional due process, 
in turn, requires that a defendant “have certain minimum contacts” with the forum state “such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”  
Freestream Aircraft, 905 F.3d at 602 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 
(1945)).   
“The strength of contacts required depends on which of the two categories of personal 
jurisdiction a litigant invokes: specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction.”  Ranza, 793 F.3d at 
1068 (citing Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 127).  General jurisdiction exists when the defendant’s 
contacts “are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”  
Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Where a defendant is subject to 
general jurisdiction, it may be sued “on any and all claims,” id. at 137, including claims “arising 
from dealings entirely distinct” from its forum-related activities, id. at 127 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  By contrast, specific jurisdiction is proper when the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum state may be more limited but the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” those contacts.  
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 
1786 (2017).  The Court discusses the requirements for specific jurisdiction in greater detail 
below.  See Part III.B. 
E. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include “a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  A complaint 
that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).  In other words, “[a] motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a 
claim.’”  Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)).  To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a 
complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  “A claim has facial plausibility when the 





































































plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  “The 
plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer 
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In evaluating the complaint, the court must “accept factual allegations in the complaint as 
true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).  At the same time, a court 
need not accept as true “allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice” or 
“allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 
inferences.”  In re Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1055 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).   
III. DISCUSSION  
Again, Defendants move to dismiss the 4AC on three grounds: lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1); lack of personal jurisdiction, under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2); and failure to state a claim, under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  The Court begins, as it must, with Defendants’ jurisdictional arguments under 
Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2).  Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999) 
(“[J]urisdiction generally must precede merits in dispositional order.”).  Finding them to be 
meritorious, the Court must dismiss the 4AC without ruling on Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  
However, because the Court grants leave to amend the 4AC, the Court also provides brief 
guidance as to the substantive elements of Plaintiffs’ causes of actions.  
A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing 
The Court begins with Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 4AC for lack of standing.  As 
noted above, Article III standing requires injury in fact, causation, and redressability.  Defendants 
first argue that the individual named plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of pleading these 
elements, which precludes standing for the putative Plaintiff Class and Plaintiff Collective.  
Defendants also raise several separate objections to CWA’s associational standing.   
The Court separately addresses the parties’ arguments as to the individual named plaintiffs 
and their arguments regarding CWA.    





































































i. Individual Named Plaintiffs 
To briefly review, there are four individual named plaintiffs in this case: Linda Bradley, 
Maurice Anscombe, Lura Callahan, and Richard Haynie (collectively, the “Named Plaintiffs”).  
Plaintiffs say they have suffered various injuries as a result of Defendants’ allegedly illegal 
conduct, including: informational injury; the denial of jobs, and the lost wages incident thereto; 
the denial of the opportunity to apply for jobs; and stigmatic injury.  The Court holds that the 
denial of the opportunity to apply for jobs, if properly alleged, would confer standing upon the 
Named Plaintiffs.  Nevertheless, the Court must grant the motion to dismiss because the 
allegations in the 4AC are too vague and conclusory to establish that the Named Plaintiffs—rather 
than unidentified members of the Plaintiff Class—personally experienced the complained-of 
injuries.   
a. Standing, In General 
The Supreme Court has written at length about Article III’s requirements of injury in fact, 
causation, and redressability.  An injury in fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that 
is (1) “concrete,” (2) “particularized,” and (3) “actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.”  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S., at 560).  First, a “concrete” 
injury is one that “actually exist[s]”; that is, it is “real” and not “abstract.”  Id.  Although both 
tangible and intangible injuries may be concrete, id., the courts have sometimes struggled with 
identifying when intangible harms are sufficiently concrete.  Fortunately, that issue is not 
presented here.  Second, “[f]or an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it must affect the plaintiff in a 
personal and individual way,” id.; the plaintiff must have a “direct stake in the controversy.”  
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 
(1973).  It is pursuant to this principle that the Supreme Court has rejected suits by litigants 
asserting “generalized grievances about the conduct of government,” Hein v. Freedom From 
Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 612 (2007), which are “undifferentiated and common to all 
members of the public.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575; see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 
488, 494 (2009) (“[G]eneralized harm to the forest or the environment will not alone support 
standing.”).  Third, the requirement that an injury be “actual or imminent” “ensure[s] that the 





































































alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly 
impending.”  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).   
There must, moreover, be a sufficient “causal connection between the injury and the 
conduct complained of.”  United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743 (1995).  Standing theories that 
depend on a “speculative chain of possibilities”—such as those that turn on “the decisions of 
independent actors”—lack the necessary causal connection.  Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414; see also 
Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442, 447 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen standing 
hinges on choices made by a third party, plaintiff must “adduce facts showing that those choices 
have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of 
injury.”) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562).  This causation requirement is closely linked to the 
redressability requirement, i.e., that it be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury 
will be redressed by a favorable decision.”  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. 
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). 
b. Plaintiffs’ Alleged Injuries 
Defendants contend that none of Plaintiffs’ four alleged injuries suffices under the above 
standards.  The Court first considers Plaintiffs’ contention that they experienced informational 
injury.  Opp. at 3.  Plaintiffs argue that, in preventing them from seeing the Facebook ads, 
Defendants “denied them information about jobs that the law requires them to receive on an equal 
basis.”  Id.   Plaintiffs rely upon Havens Realty Corporation v. Coleman, in which the Supreme 
Court held that black testers who had no intention of buying or renting a home nevertheless had 
standing to enforce their statutory right “to truthful information concerning the availability of 
housing,” because they had been injured by receiving false information.  455 U.S. 363, 374 
(1982).  The injury, in other words, was the tester’s “statutory right to truthful housing 
information.”  Id. at 375; see also Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 297 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (following Havens).  These so-called “tester” cases are inapposite, however, because 
they involve litigants who sought and were then denied truthful information.  The Plaintiffs in this 
case did not seek employment information from Defendants.  That distinction is important because 
the Havens Court also rejected the proposition that all black people had standing: Plaintiff Willis 





































































lacked standing because he had not received false information and thus had not been injured.  455 
U.S. at 375.  The Court finds that the type of information injury in Havens is not present here.   
Second, Plaintiffs say they have “lost wages due to losing out on jobs ‘they would have 
pursued and obtained’” had they seen the age-restricted ads.  Opp. at 2 (quoting 4AC ¶ 247).   
Defendants object that, though lost wages are undoubtedly concrete, this “supposed injury” rests 
on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities.”  Reply at 7 (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410-12).  
That is, Defendants believe redressability is lacking because Plaintiffs have not shown that they 
would have applied for and received the jobs if they had seen the ads in question.  The point is 
well-taken.  Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegation that they “would have pursued” some of the 
advertised jobs, 4AC ¶¶ 32, 34, 36, 38, many factors may have affected whether Plaintiffs would 
have then been hired.  Hence, the Court agrees that the injury in cases like this one should not be 
cast in terms of lost wages; instead, “the injury lies in the denial of an equal opportunity to 
compete, not the denial of the job itself.”  Shea v. Kerry, 796 F.3d 42, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  That 
is, of course, Plaintiffs’ third alleged injury: the denial of the opportunity to apply for jobs because 
of their age.   
It is well-established that the denial of an opportunity to obtain a benefit is itself an injury 
in fact.  See, e.g., Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Article III’s 
strictures are met not only when a plaintiff complains of being deprived of some benefit, but also 
when a plaintiff complains that she was deprived of a chance to obtain a benefit.”).  Consider, for 
example, challenges to race-based set aside programs—that is, programs requiring that a certain 
percentage of government contracts go to minority-owned businesses.  See, e.g., Northeastern Fla. 
Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1993).  
In such cases, the Supreme Court has said that “the injury in fact is the inability to compete on an 
equal footing in the bidding process, not the loss of contract.”  Id. at 667; see also Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995) (internal quotation marks and alterations 
omitted) (“The injury in cases of this kind is that a discriminatory classification prevents the 
plaintiff from competing on an equal footing.”).   
That injury has also been recognized in cases challenging allegedly discriminatory criteria 





































































rather than strict quotas.  For instance, in affirmative action cases, the Supreme Court has 
identified the injury in fact as the denial of “the opportunity to compete for admission on an equal 
basis.”  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 261–62 (2003); see also Regents of Univ. of California 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 (1978) (finding Article III injury not in the “failure to be admitted” 
but “in the University’s decision not to permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in the class, 
simply because of his race”).  Other examples include programs for awarding public benefits to 
individuals, e.g., Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 941 (9th Cir. 2003), or public funding to 
entities, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 946 F.3d at 1108.   
And because the injury is the denial of the chance to seek the benefit, “the aggrieved party 
need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the barrier in order to establish 
standing.”  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Planned 
Parenthood, 946 F.3d at 1108 (explaining that a plaintiff “need not participate in the competition” 
to suffer injury in fact, so long as it is “able and ready” to do so); Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. 
Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 657 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The individual plaintiffs in the present action are not 
required to demonstrate that but for the weighted lottery process they would obtain admission to 
one of the voluntary schools.”).  Redressability is satisfied in that removal of the barrier restores or 
increases the litigant’s chances of obtaining the benefit.   
These situations are closely analogous to the one at hand.  The 4AC alleges that 
Defendants imposed age restrictions on their Facebook ads that prevented the Named Plaintiffs 
from seeing the ads and thereby learning about various job openings at Amazon and T-Mobile.  
See, e.g., 4AC ¶¶ 32- 38.  Because they did not become aware of these job openings, they were 
unable to apply.  After all, knowledge of the job openings is a prerequisite for Plaintiffs to apply 
and compete for those jobs.  Defendants’ allegedly discriminatory conduct—i.e., the age 
restriction on the employment ads—constituted a barrier to Plaintiffs’ knowledge.  The removal of 
that barrier restores—indeed, it creates—Plaintiffs’ opportunity to compete for the advertised jobs, 
thus redressing their injury. 
It bears emphasizing that Plaintiffs’ theory is that they were literally prevented from 
applying when they were prevented from learning about the positions.  As a result, Plaintiffs need 





































































not show that they were “effectively deterred” from applying, Mot. at 11, or that applying “would 
have been a futile gesture,” Mot. at 12.  These standards arose to deal with factual situations that 
are quite different from the one at hand.  Courts use those standards to assure causation, separating 
cases in which a plaintiff was “discouraged from applying” from those in which the plaintiff 
“simply failed to do so.”  Breiner v. Nevada Dep’t of Corr., 610 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2010); 
see Hailes v. United Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1972).  If a plaintiff “simply failed” 
to apply, that failure could not be attributed to the defendant’s actions.  But there is no question of 
causation where, as here, Plaintiffs allege that it was not within their power to apply because they 
were unaware of the jobs.   
In other words, just as the plaintiffs in Northeastern Florida were purportedly denied an 
opportunity to bid on certain contracts, the named plaintiffs in this case were denied an 
opportunity to apply for certain jobs.  The Court therefore finds that Article III standing could 
properly be grounded in the denial of Plaintiffs’ opportunity to apply for jobs, though not in the 
denial of the jobs themselves.   
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged 
that they personally have experienced such injuries.  Time and again courts have emphasized that 
“[t]he existence of a racial or gender barrier is not enough to establish standing, without a 
plaintiff’s showing that she has been . . . subjected to such a barrier.”  Braunstein v. Arizona Dep’t 
of Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1185 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Scott, 306 F.3d at 657).  Members of the 
disfavored group do not automatically have a “direct stake in the controversy,” SCRAP, 412 U.S. 
at 687; they are merely “concerned bystanders” unless they personally experience the 
discriminatory conduct.  Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984), abrogated on other 
grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).  This 
principle applies with equal force in cases of age-based discrimination.  Moreover, in class 
actions, “named plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show that they personally have 
been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to 
which they belong and which they purport to represent.”  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 
(1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   





































































Here, that means that the Named Plaintiffs must show that they were deprived of the 
opportunity to apply for jobs.  To do so, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that they were “able and 
ready” to apply for one or more of the jobs advertised using age-restricted ads.  See, e.g., Planned 
Parenthood, 946 F.3d at 1108 (“It is a plaintiff’s ability and readiness to bid that ensures an 
injury-in-fact is concrete and particular.”); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 261–62 (plaintiff had standing to 
challenge university’s race-conscious transfer admissions policy, even though he never applied as 
a transfer student, because he demonstrated that he was “able and ready” to do so); see generally 
Breiner, 610 F.3d at 1206 (“[A] nonapplicant suffers an invasion of a legally protected interest . . . 
if he would have applied for the job had it not been for the employer’s discriminatory practices.”).  
In this context, to be “able” means qualified and to be “ready” means seeking employment and 
genuinely interested in the position.  Cf. Bates, 511 F.3d at 988 (Habib had standing to challenge 
hearing standard because there was no other qualification standard “that prevented him from 
applying for the job”); Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, Inc., 98 F.3d 590, 596 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (“Persons who merely see a discriminatory advertisement” but are not interested in the 
advertised housing or lack qualifications are no more than “concerned bystanders.”).     
Plaintiffs maintain that the 4AC contains the necessary allegations to show each of the 
Named Plaintiffs have been denied the opportunity to apply for jobs with Defendants.  Opp. at 5.  
The 4AC alleges that each of the Named Plaintiffs were “qualified to perform one or more jobs at 
each of the Defendants that was offered during the time period at issue” and that they would have 
“pursued” those “specific job opportunities.”  See 4AC ¶¶ 31-38.  The 4AC further alleges that the 
Facebook ads for these jobs were subject to age restrictions and that, as a result, the Named 
Plaintiffs did not receive the ads and did not learn about the jobs.  Id.  Importantly, however, the 
4AC does not identify—even by way of example—a single job for which these allegations are 
true.  That is a fatal failing.  The Third Circuit’s decision in Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town 
of Harrison, N.J. is instructive on this point.  907 F.2d 1408 (3d Cir. 1990).  There, the court held 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge Harrison, New Jersey’s residency requirement for 
municipal jobs as having a disparate impact on blacks.  Id. at 1409, 1412, 1416.  The court 
explained: “The fact that Harrison may have been utilizing employment practices which had a 





































































discriminatory impact on blacks does not, in and of itself, mean . . . that every black who may 
have been generally interested in jobs similar to those offered by Harrison during this period were 
thereby injured by those practices.”  Id. at 1416.   
So too here.  To establish personalized injury, the Named Plaintiffs must show they were 
qualified for and interested in the particular jobs subject to Defendants’ allegedly discriminatory 
practices.  Those jobs could either be advertised on the face of the Facebook ad or be posted on a 
website—such as a Defendant’s Careers page—to which the ad linked.  Yet, the 4AC alleges 
generally that T-Mobile and Amazon advertised “for a range of positions,” 4AC ¶¶ 39-40, without 
providing any description or examples of these positions to suggest that the Named Plaintiffs 
would have been able and ready to apply for them.  The broad allegation that “one or more” such 
positions exist as to each Named Plaintiff is, by itself, merely conclusory.  And although the 4AC 
suggests certain job titles for which each Named Plaintiff would be qualified, see, e.g., id. ¶ 37 
(“Mr. Haynie would be qualified for a range of positions at T-Mobile, including but not limited to 
Technology Innovation Designer Videographer”), the 4AC does not allege that there were open 
positions for those job titles during the relevant time period—much less that those positions were 
advertised using age-restricted ads.  To be sure, there are likely to be members of the Plaintiff 
Class that were prevented from seeing ads for jobs to which they were able and ready to apply, 
and thus were deprived of the opportunity to so apply.  But under the allegations in the 4AC, the 
Named Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they themselves experienced that deprivation.   
Plaintiffs’ fourth alleged injury—stigmatic injury—fails for the same reason.  Stigmatic 
injury—i.e., “stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as innately inferior and therefore as 
less worthy”—certainly may confer Article III standing in discrimination cases.  Heckler v. 
Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739 (1984).  Nonetheless, not every member of the disfavored group is 
stigmatized for standing purposes by virtue of discriminatory conduct.  Allen, 468 U.S. 755-56.  
As the Supreme Court has said, stigmatic injury “accords a basis for standing only to those 
persons who are personally denied equal treatment by the challenged discriminatory conduct.”  Id. 
at 755.  Having failed to show that the Named Plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to apply for 
jobs in which they were interested and for which they were qualified, Plaintiffs also have not 





































































shown that they were stigmatized by that denial.  At most, Plaintiffs have pleaded that they are 
members of the disfavored group—older workers.  Plaintiffs can only establish stigmatic injury to 
the extent they can establish the denial of the opportunity to apply; the two theories of injury rise 
and (in this case) fall together.   
In sum, to have Article III standing, the Named Plaintiffs must show that (1) there were 
jobs for which they were qualified and (2) in which they were genuinely interested that (3) the 
Defendants advertised using age-restricted Facebook ads and (4) about which the Named Plaintiffs 
never learned.  They have not done so, and therefore lack standing to bring this suit.      
ii. Associational Standing of CWA 
The Court now turns to the standing of CWA, which is a plaintiff for various claims in the 
4AC.  An association may have standing in either of two ways: (1) first-party standing, on its own 
behalf, see, e.g., Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 2002), or (2) third-
party standing, on behalf its members, see, e.g., Am. Diabetes Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of the 
Army, 938 F.3d 1147, 1155 (9th Cir. 2019).  CWA asserts only the latter, Opp. at 7, which 
requires a showing that “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; 
(b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purposes; and (c) neither the 
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the 
lawsuit.”  Id.  
Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that CWA’s members would have standing 
to sue in their own right.  To meet this requirement, Plaintiffs need only show that one of CWA’s 
members has standing.  See Carrico v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th 
Cir. 2011).  Here, Plaintiffs offer the three Named Plaintiffs who are also members of CWA: 
Bradley, Anscombe, and Callahan.  See 4AC ¶¶ 31, 33, 35.  However, the Court’s above 
determination that their standing has not been adequately alleged also means that these Named 
Plaintiffs cannot establish CWA’s standing.   
At the hearing, Plaintiffs also pointed to its broad allegation that “[n]umerous members of 
CWA who are also members of the proposed Class reside in this District and elsewhere in 
California, and they have been denied advertisements about jobs at Amazon and T-Mobile within 





































































the State of California concerning jobs in this District.”  4AC ¶ 30.  Plaintiffs believe this 
allegation suffices because “[i]n this Circuit, organizational plaintiffs need not ‘specifically 
identif[y] a member of the organization to establish standing for the organization.’”  ECF 164 
(“Tr.”) at 24; see ECF 91 at 44 (quoting Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Cegavske, 800 F.3d 1032, 
1041 (9th Cir. 2015)).  Plaintiffs are incorrect.  The cited case refers to the pleading standard for 
first-party standing, not third-party standing on behalf of an organization’s members.  An 
organization has first-party standing if it can show “(1) frustration of its organizational mission; 
and (2) diversion of its resources to combat the particular conduct at issue,” Am. Diabetes Ass’n, 
938 F.3d at 1154, and it is unsurprising that identification of individual members is unnecessary to 
do make that showing.  By contrast, the Supreme Court has required “individual affidavits” from 
members in order for an organization to plausibly allege third-party standing.  Summers, 555 U.S. 
at 499 (“Without individual affidavits, how is the court to assure itself that the Sierra Club, for 
example, has ‘thousands of members’ who ‘use and enjoy the Sequoia National Forest’?”).  
“While it is certainly possible—perhaps even likely—that one individual will” be able to establish 
standing to sue, “that speculation does not suffice.”  Id.  Hence, Plaintiffs have not made a 
sufficient showing that CWA’s members would have standing to sue in their own right.  
Defendants also oppose CWA’s standing on the basis of the third prong—that “neither the 
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the 
lawsuit.”  Mot. at 14.  Unlike the first two, this prong is not mandated by Article III; it is “merely 
prudential,” “designed to promote efficiency in adjudication.”  Cent. Delta Water Agency v. 
United States, 306 F.3d 938, 951 n.9 (9th Cir. 2002).  More to the point, it is not typically 
implicated where, as here, the organization does not seek damages on behalf of its members, see 
Opp. at 7 (“CWA does not seek (and waives any right to) monetary damages.”).  See, e.g., Alaska 
Fish & Wildlife Fed’n & Outdoor Council, Inc. v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(“[B]ecause the Fund seeks declaratory and prospective relief rather than money damages, its 
members need not participate directly in the litigation.”); United Food & Commercial Workers 
Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 546 (1996) (affirming prior holding that 
“individual participation is not normally necessary when an association seeks prospective or 





































































injunctive relief for its members”).  In this case, the Court does not see any special need for the 
individual participation of CWA’s members.  “Although the participation of some individual 
plaintiffs may be needed to present the case for injunctive relief, it is highly unlikely that the 
participation of each injured plaintiff will be required.”  Asociacion De Productores v. California 
Avocado Comm’n, No. SACV08570JVSFFMX, 2009 WL 10698881, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 
2009).  The Court therefore rejects Defendants’ contention that “individualized proof” is necessary 
and precludes CWA’s associational standing.     
Finally, the parties do not dispute that the interests CWA seeks to protect are germane to 
its purpose.  See Mot. at 14; Reply at 10.  Accordingly, the only barrier to CWA’s standing is its 
ability to adequately plead the standing of at least one member.   
*** 
Because neither the individual Named Plaintiffs nor CWA has standing to bring this suit, 
the Court must GRANT the motion to dismiss the 4AC for lack of Article III standing.   
B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 
Defendants also move to dismiss the 4AC for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Mot. at 5-9.  It 
is well-established that, without jurisdiction, a court is “powerless to proceed to an adjudication.”  
Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584.  The Plaintiffs’ failure to establish Article III standing means that the 
Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction.  It is equally clear, however, that “[j]urisdiction is 
vital only if the court proposes to issue a judgment on the merits.”  Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia 
Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007).  “Personal jurisdiction, too, is an essential element 
of the jurisdiction of a district court.”  Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584 (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted).  Accordingly, and to aid Plaintiffs’ likely amendment of its complaint, the 
Court now recognizes that the Court’s lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendants is another 
jurisdictional barrier to Plaintiffs’ suit.   
At the outset, the Court confirms that “Defendants have not waived their personal 
jurisdiction defense.”  Mot. at 9.  The 4AC alleges that Facebook’s Terms of Service contain a 
choice of venue provision requiring its users “to resolve any disputes related to their use of 
Facebook in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California or a state court located 





































































in San Mateo County” and to “submit to the personal jurisdiction of such courts.”  4AC ¶ 27.  The 
4AC alleges that Defendants agreed to these Terms of Service and have thus “consented to 
personal jurisdiction and venue in this Court and have waived any argument that exercising 
personal jurisdiction over them with respect to their discriminatory advertising on Facebook is 
improper, unlawful, or unconstitutional.”  Id.  In response, Defendants have submitted a copy of 
the Terms of Service, ECF 143-2, which are incorporated by reference into the 4AC and thus may 
be considered on a motion to dismiss.  See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 
2007) (affirming that “a court may consider a writing referenced in a complaint but not explicitly 
incorporated therein if the complaint relies on the document and its authenticity is unquestioned”).  
The full venue provision contained therein states that it applies to disputes “against us”—i.e., 
Facebook.  As Facebook is not a party to the instant action, the Court agrees with Defendants that 
the venue provision does not apply here.  Meanwhile, Plaintiffs’ briefing does not challenge the 
accuracy of Defendants’ copy of the Terms of Service or otherwise advance the waiver allegation 
made in the 4AC.  The Court therefore finds that Defendants have not waived their personal 
jurisdiction challenge.     
With regard to that challenge, Defendants contend that their contacts with California are 
insufficient to justify either general or specific jurisdiction.  In response, Plaintiffs assert that this 
Court has specific jurisdiction over the claims for which Haynie and/or the CWA are plaintiffs.  
See Opp. at 7-8.  They concede that the Court would not have specific jurisdiction over the claims 
brought by Bradley, Anscombe, and Callahan in their individual capacities.  Tr. at 22.  Plaintiffs 
therefore ask the Court to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over them instead.  See id.; Opp. 
at 14.   
iii. Specific Jurisdiction  
The Court begins with specific jurisdiction, which Plaintiffs assert as to the claims brought 
by Haynie and the CWA—i.e., the claims under the ADEA and California law.2  The Ninth 
Circuit has set forth a three-prong test for whether a defendant has the “minimum contacts” 
                                                 
2 Counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 11.   





































































necessary for specific jurisdiction:  
(1) the defendant must either “purposefully direct his activities” 
toward the forum or “purposefully avail himself of the privileges of 
conducting activities in the forum”;  
(2) “the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the 
defendant’s forum-related activities”; and  
(3) “the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and 
substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.”   
Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Dole 
Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002)).  “The plaintiff bears the burden of 
satisfying the first two prongs of the test.”  Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 
797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004).  If the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing as to those first two prongs, 
“the burden then shifts to the defendant to ‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of 
jurisdiction would not be reasonable.”  Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 
462, 477 (1985)).   
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden of establishing the first and 
second prongs, and the Court agrees.   
The first prong of the specific jurisdiction test is met if the defendant “purposefully 
directed” his activities toward the forum or “purposefully availed” himself of “the privileges of 
conducting activities in the forum.”  The Ninth Circuit has said that “purposeful availment” and 
“purposeful direction” are “two distinct concepts.”  Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802.  The former 
applies to claims sounding in contract whereas the latter applies to claims sounding in tort.  Picot 
v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2015).  Because Plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination are 
“more akin to tort claims,” the Court employs the purposeful direction framework.  Ziegler v. 
Indian River Cty., 64 F.3d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing with approval an ADEA case in which 
the district court applied the tort-case standard); see Opp. at 9.   
Purposeful direction, in turn, can be shown in two ways.  First, the Ninth Circuit has said 
that “the commission of an intentional tort in a state is a purposeful act that will satisfy” the 
purposeful direction test.  Freestream Aircraft, 905 F.3d at 603.  In other words, if the “allegedly 
intentional tortious conduct” occurred in the forum state, that conduct has plainly been 
purposefully directed at the forum state.  Id.  Alternatively, if the defendant’s conduct “takes place 





































































outside the forum,” there may still be purposeful direction if that conduct “has effects inside the 
forum state.”  Id. at 604.  This second method of showing purposeful direction is known as the 
“effects” test from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).  Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1069.   
Plaintiffs advance both theories of purposeful direction, arguing (1) that “Defendants’ 
discriminatory conduct occurred in California,” Opp. at 8, and (2) that Defendants “directed their 
biased advertising and recruiting activities to California,” Opp. at 10.  The Court considers each in 
turn.    
As to the first theory, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ acts of discrimination occurred in 
California because “the ads were created in California and published to California residents.”  
Opp. at 9.  Specifically, Plaintiffs point to allegations that Defendants: 
• “[I]ntentionally created and purchased discriminatory ads in this District via 
Facebook’s ad platform that is located in this District,” 4AC ¶ 22; 
• “[I]nteracted with Facebook’s employees who are located in this District to create, 
purchase, and publish” the ads, id.; and  
• “[U]sed Facebook’s delivery algorithm in California,” Opp. at 9 (citing 4AC ¶ 83).   
According to Plaintiffs, these allegations show that Defendants’ tortious activity occurred in 
California because “the Ninth Circuit has held that violations of employment discrimination laws 
occur both were unlawful decisions are made and where those decisions are implemented.”  Opp. 
at 9 (citing Passantino v. J&J Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 504-05 (9th Cir. 2000)).   
Where, as here, Defendants are alleged to have violated the anti-discrimination laws 
through online activity, the question of where the tortious activity “occurred” is a somewhat 
metaphysical one.  Passantino—upon which Plaintiffs rely—does not provide an answer.  As 
Defendants correctly point out, Passsantino concerned the proper construction of Title VII’s 
venue provision, not the minimum contacts analysis of personal jurisdiction.  Reply at 3; see 212 
F.3d at 504-06.  Nor is the Court aware of any other case supporting Plaintiffs’ view.  For 
instance, Freestream Aircraft—which clarified the Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence in this area—
involved more straightforward facts.  There, the defendant had “committed the intentional tort of 
defamation while present in the forum state”: He spoke the allegedly defamatory oral statements 





































































while physically present in Nevada.  Id. at 601-03.  Here, by contrast, it is not alleged that any of 
Defendants’ actions was carried out through employees located in California, or that Defendants 
were otherwise present in the forum state when they “created and purchased” the ads, “interacted” 
with Facebook, or “used” the algorithm.   
The Court is also mindful of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent admonition that the 
minimum contacts analysis focuses upon “contacts that the defendant himself creates with the 
forum State” and not the contacts of a third party with whom the defendant is associated.  Walden 
v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (emphasis in original).  That Facebook’s ad platform and 
Facebook employees are allegedly located in this District goes to Facebook’s contacts with 
California, not Defendants’.  Stripping away Facebook’s conduct, the Court sees no allegations of 
conduct by Defendants’ themselves that occurred in California.  The Court is therefore skeptical 
that, based on Plaintiffs’ allegations, it can fairly be said that Defendants’ allegedly tortious 
conduct “occurred” in California.   
Nor is the Court persuaded that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged their theory under the 
Calder effects test.  The Calder effects test requires that the defendant have “(1) committed an 
intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows 
is likely to be suffered in the forum state.”  Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1069 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  Beginning with the first element, the Ninth Circuit has explained that 
the “intentional act” requirement means an “actual, physical act in the real world”; it does not 
require “an intent to accomplish a result or consequence of that act.”  Brayton Purcell LLP v. 
Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  The parties seem to agree that Defendants are alleged to have committed several 
“intentional acts,” including: creating and purchasing Facebook ads that solicited workers to apply 
for jobs, directing those ads to Facebook users located in California and throughout the United 
States, and excluding older workers from receiving the ads.  4AC ¶¶ 22-24.  The question becomes 
whether these acts were “expressly aimed” at California, as required to satisfy the second element 
of the Calder effects test.  Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1069.   
Courts have “struggled with the question whether tortious conduct on a nationally 





































































accessible website is expressly aimed at any, or all, of the forums in which the website can be 
viewed.”  Mavrix Photo, Inc., 647 F.3d at 1229.  As relevant here, though, most courts have 
concluded that a nationwide advertising campaign is not “expressly aimed” to each state in which 
the advertisement appears.  See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. V. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418-19 (9th 
Cir. 1997); Surface Supplied Inc. v. Kirby Morgan Dive Sys., Inc., No. C 13-575 MMC, 2013 WL 
2355446, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2013) (“Advertising in national publications or on Facebook 
and Twitter, however, is not sufficient to support a finding of purposeful availment.”); JibJab 
Media Inc. v. White Castle Mgmt., No. CV1204178MMMJEMX, 2013 WL 12123696, at *6 (C.D. 
Cal. May 14, 2013) (“The fact that a defendant does not prevent its online content from reaching 
residents of the forum state does not, however, demonstrate that it purposefully directed its online 
activities towards any individual residing forum state.”); see also Cascade Corp. v. Hiab–Foco 
AB, 619 F.2d 36, 37–38 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding no specific jurisdiction where defendant 
advertised in “national publications” circulated in forum, visited forum on two occasions, and 
mailed accusatory letters to plaintiff in forum); but see In re Oreck Corp. Halo Vacuum & Air 
Purifiers Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. ML 12-2317 CAS JEMX, 2012 WL 6062047, at *8 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012).  There must be “something more” to demonstrate that the defendant 
directed his activity toward the forum state.  Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 418.    
In Mavrix—the case upon which Plaintiffs principally rely—that “something more” was 
found in the subject matter of the website, which had a “specific focus on the California-centered 
celebrity and entertainment industries.”  647 F.3d at 1230.  But here, unlike in Mavrix, the content 
of the advertisements did not specifically target California residents or focus on jobs available in 
California.  Accord DFSB Kollective Co. v. Bourne, 897 F. Supp. 2d 871, 882 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(“Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that any of the advertisements on Defendant’s Websites targeted 
Californians.”).  Although Plaintiffs allege that “Amazon and T-Mobile each sent at least hundreds 
of thousands of age-restricted advertisements to Facebook users throughout the United States, 
including users in California and in this District,” 4AC ¶ 25, and that Defendants “advertised 
thousands of jobs that are located in California,” id. ¶ 24, these allegations are unsupported and 
conclusory.  Plaintiffs do not cite any examples of age-restricted ads sent to Californians or 





































































advertising job openings located in California, or otherwise explain the factual basis for their 
allegations.  The only examples Plaintiffs do cite are three ads that were not subject to the 
challenged age restriction; they were visible to all “people ages 18 and older.”  ECF 154-2.  In the 
Court’s view, these ads cannot support an inference that Defendants sent age-restricted ads to 
Californians.  They do support an inference that Defendants used non-age-restricted ads in 
California, but it cannot be said that Plaintiffs’ claims “arise out of” non-age-restricted ads.   
All told, Plaintiffs’ allegations appear to be based on nothing more than the fact that 
California is part of the United States and the lack of any evidence that Defendants exempted 
California from their nationwide campaign.  That is simply not enough to establish that 
Defendants’ “expressly aimed” the challenged advertisements at California.  As a result, Plaintiffs 
have not adequately pleaded specific jurisdiction.   
iv. Pendent Personal Jurisdiction  
As to the claims brought by Bradley, Anscombe, and Callahan in their individual 
capacities under Ohio and D.C. law3, Plaintiffs ask the Court to exercise pendent personal 
jurisdiction.  The doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction—which has been adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit—permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over “a claim for which there is no 
independent basis of personal jurisdiction so long as it arises out of a common nucleus of 
operative facts with a claim in the same suit over which the court does have personal jurisdiction.”  
CE Distribution, LLC v. New Sensor Corp., 380 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004).  It is a 
discretionary doctrine.  Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 
(9th Cir. 2004).  That is, even if a claim “arises out of a common nucleus of operative facts” as a 
claim over which a district court has personal jurisdiction, the court may “dismiss the pendent 
claims where considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants so dictate.”  
Id. at 1181.   
Of course, in this case, there are no claims over which the Court properly has personal 
jurisdiction, for the Court has dismissed the claims of Haynie and the CWA.  As a result, the Court 
                                                 
3 Counts 4, 5, 7, and 8.   





































































necessarily lacks personal jurisdiction over Bradley’s, Anscombe’s, and Callahan’s claims.  The 
Court need not consider whether it could or should exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over 
these claims if the Court did have jurisdiction over the claims of Haynie and the CWA.  Those 
issues—which Defendants did not address in their briefing—will be left to another day.   
C. Leave to Amend and Jurisdictional Discovery 
Having found that the 4AC must be dismissed, the Court now considers whether to permit 
leave to amend and whether to grant jurisdictional discovery.  
v. Leave to Amend 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a), leave to amend “shall be freely given 
when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate 
decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.”  Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 
1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has instructed district courts to grant leave to amend unless one or 
more of the following factors is present: (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory motive, (3) 
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment, (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party, and 
(5) futility of amendment.  See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).   
Defendants oppose leave to amend, arguing that Plaintiffs have already amended their 
pleadings four times, and one of those amendments was after a hearing on Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss the TAC.  Defendants also point out that this case has been pending for over two years, 
yet it remains at the pleading stage.  See ECF 1 (Complaint filed December 2017).  These are 
compelling concerns, no doubt.  On the other hand, this is the Court’s first order assessing the 
sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ pleading.  See United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 
1161, 1183 (9th Cir. 2016) (reversing denial of leave to amend even though the plaintiff had 
previously amended his pleading three times).  Moreover, “delay alone is not sufficient to justify 
the denial of . . . leave to amend,” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 
1987), and Defendants have not articulated any specific prejudice beyond the burden of continuing 
to defend this litigation.  The Court therefore concludes that leave to amend is appropriate.   





































































vi. Jurisdictional Discovery 
The Court also finds that Plaintiffs have justified their need for jurisdictional discovery and 
proffered a sufficiently narrow request.  See ECF 165, 168.  As discussed above, in order to justify 
this Court’s personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that Defendants sent age-
restricted ads to California residents.  Similarly, in order to establish their Article III standing, the 
Named Plaintiffs must plausibly allege the existence of at least some specific jobs for which they 
would have applied, but for the age restriction.  That is so even though the basis of their suit is that 
they never saw the challenged advertisements; they are not relieved of the requirement of showing 
they personally experienced injury in fact.  At the same time, the Court recognizes the difficulty of 
identifying advertisements that the entire Plaintiff Class was allegedly prevented from seeing; 
such information is not within Plaintiffs’ possession and is difficult to obtain.  Thus, jurisdictional 
discovery will be helpful—if not necessary—to establish the jurisdictional facts identified in this 
order.  And although the 4AC has various deficiencies, the factual allegations contained therein 
are sufficiently specific and confined that jurisdictional discovery will not be a “fishing 
expedition,” Reply at 6.     
Accordingly, the Court will GRANT the request for jurisdictional discovery, as narrowed 
by Plaintiffs’ Letter at ECF 168 to exclude ads that were not age-restricted.  The Court agrees with 
Defendants that non-age-restricted ads—while potentially relevant to the merits of Plaintiffs’ 
claims—are not necessary to ascertain the jurisdictional facts, see ECF 166.  The Court is satisfied 
that Plaintiffs’ narrowed request is not overbroad and will not unduly burden Defendants.   
vii. Other Deficiencies in the Complaint 
As usual, leave to amend is restricted to the defects discussed in this order and in 
Defendants’ motion; Plaintiffs may not add new parties or claims without obtaining prior express 
leave of the Court.  However, the Court emphasizes that Plaintiffs are encouraged to address any 
issues raised in Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state claim, even though the Court 
lacks jurisdiction to formally adjudicate that motion.  In light of Plaintiffs’ multiple prior 
amendments and the years this case has been pending, the Court will be reluctant to allow 
additional opportunities for amendment.  Hence, in the interest of efficiency and to guide Plaintiffs 





































































in making their amendments, the Court weighs in briefly on two of Defendants’ arguments 
regarding the substantive sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims.    
First, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot make out a disparate treatment claim under 
the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (Count 2).  See Mot. at 22-25.  Section 623(a)(1) 4 makes it 
unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such 
individual’s age.”  Although disparate treatment claims may also be based on “ad hoc, informal” 
discrimination, Plaintiffs allege a “formal, facially discriminatory policy,” Hazen Paper Co. v. 
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993), namely: a practice of expressly excluding workers from being 
recruited based upon their age, see Opp. at 23.   
The Supreme Court has stated in no uncertain terms that, “to establish a disparate-
treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA, . . . a plaintiff must prove that age was the 
‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.”  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 
176 (2009).  That is, the ADEA does not permit “a mixed-motives age discrimination claim.”  Id. 
at 175.  As the Supreme Court has further explained, “[a]n act or omission is not regarded as a 
cause of an event if the particular event would have occurred without it.”  Id. at 177.  Defendants 
argue that Plaintiffs have not stated a disparate treatment claim because they cannot allege that 
“they would have been hired but for their age.”  Mot. at 23.  This objection appears to have merit.  
Plaintiffs respond that a plaintiff in an ADEA case is not required to plead the McDonnell 
Douglas factors for a prima facie case.  Opp. at 23 (citing Sheppard v. David Evans & Assoc., 694 
F.3d 1045, 1050 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012)).  True enough.  The reason is that McDonnell Douglas is a 
burden-shifting framework used in cases where direct evidence in unavailable.  Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002).  The McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the 
plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination,” including where a policy is “discriminatory 
on its face.”  Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).  In other words, 
                                                 
4 At the hearing, Plaintiffs confirmed that they are bringing only a disparate treatment claim and 
not a disparate impact claim.  Tr. at 37-38.  Plaintiffs believe that 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)—which 
has been held to be authorize disparate impact claims, see Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 
U.S. 228, 232 (2005)—also bars disparate treatment.  Whether that is true, however, is beyond the 
scope of this order, as 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) indisputably provides for disparate treatment liability.  





































































Plaintiffs may ultimately prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence that age was the “but-
for” cause of the challenged employer decision.  Gross, 557 U.S. at 177.   But that does not 
absolve Plaintiffs of pleading but-for causation, which is a necessary element of a disparate 
treatment claim.   
As it currently stands, the 4AC does not appear to allege that Plaintiffs would have been 
hired but for the discriminatory advertising practice.  Remember, hiring is the challenged 
employment decision under § 623(a).  It is true, as Plaintiffs emphasize, that they have alleged an 
advertising policy that is “discriminatory on its face.”  Opp. at 23.  But they have not alleged a 
facially discriminatory hiring policy.  The Court accepts Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants’ 
advertising practices “cause[] a larger number of younger workers to apply for the jobs,” which 
may then lead a larger number of younger workers to ultimately be hired.  See Opp. at 24 (citing 
4AC ¶ 171).  But these allegations do not give rise to an inference that Defendants would refuse to 
hire older workers if they did apply, much less that Defendants would do so because of their age.  
Indeed, the 4AC contains few allegations pertaining to Defendants’ hiring decisions, as opposed to 
the advertising practices.  To be sure, a discriminatory recruiting policy could lead to or be a part 
of a discriminatory hiring policy; however, Plaintiffs have not made such allegations.  
In addition, the Court is not convinced that Plaintiffs have stated a claim under the Unruh 
Act (Count 9).  Defendants argue that “the Act does not reach employment advertising or hiring,” 
Mot. at 13; see also id. at 25, and the Court believes they are likely correct.  The Unruh Act 
guarantees “full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all 
business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”  Cal. Civ. Code. § 51(b).  Interpreting the 
phrase “business establishments,” the California Supreme Court has held that “the Act does not 
cover ‘the employer-employee relationship.’”  Alch v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 4th 339, 391 
(2004) (quoting Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 83 n.12 (1985)).  That is, 
the Unruh Act forbids only discriminations by “made by a ‘business establishment’ in the course 
of furnishing goods, services or facilities to its clients, patrons or customers,” which does not 
include employment discrimination.  Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 500 (1970).  In 
the Court’s view, Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that information about Defendants’ employment 





































































opportunities are among Defendants’ “goods, services or facilities,” 4AC ¶ 235, is not plausible.  
Though Plaintiffs are applicants rather than literal employees, their claims appear to relate to the 
employer-employee relationship rather than to, say the online goods that Amazon sells or the 
wireless services that T-Mobile offers.  Thus, the Court does not believe Plaintiffs have shown that 
they are “in a relationship with [Defendants] similar to that of the customer in the customer-
proprietor relationship,” Strother v. S. California Permanente Med. Grp., 79 F.3d 859, 874 (9th 
Cir. 1996), as opposed to that of the employee in the employer-employee relationship.   
None of the foregoing should be considered the Court’s complete or final views on the 
sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims.  Nevertheless, Plaintiffs are advised to remedy these likely 
problems in preparing the 5AC.  
IV. ORDER 
 For the above reasons, the 4AC is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND and the 
request for jurisdictional discovery is GRANTED.  The parties shall develop a discovery plan and 
propose a deadline for Plaintiffs to file the 5AC.  Their proposed schedule shall be filed by March 
20, 2020.  When the 5AC is filed, Plaintiffs are directed to include a redlined complaint as an 
attachment to the 5AC.   
 
IT IS SO ORDERED.  
 
Dated:  March 13, 2020 
 ______________________________________ 
BETH LABSON FREEMAN 
United States District Judge 
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